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NOTES
Criminal Procedure: Searching High and Low for a Search
in Kyllo: Justice Scalia Reaffirms Core Protections of the
Fourth Amendment
. Introduction
"At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."' The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
sanctity of the home in Kyllo v. United States.2 In Kyllo, the Court held that
when "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."3 The "device" at issue in
Kyllo was a thermal imager,4 a sense-enhancing device, the use of which
many circuit courts had previously held was not a "search" falling within
Fourth Amendment protection. 5 That the Supreme Court found otherwise
is surprising to some,6 especially considering the pro-law enforcement "waron-drugs" attitude taken by the Court in recent years.7 Perhaps more
surprising is that Justice Scalia' wrote the majority opinion for the Court,
while Justice Stevens dissented.

1. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. Id.at 40.
4. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (description of thermal imager).
5. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668 (7th Cir 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
6. See Annabelle L. Lisic, Thermal Imaging and the FourthAmendment, MD. B.J., Feb.
2001, at 16, 21 ("Under any analysis employed by the Court in Smith, Knotts, Karo, Place,
Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, or Riley, warrantless use of thermal imaging devices passes
constitutional muster.").
7. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists,andthe Futureof the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 303-07.
8. See Kenneth Lerner, Privacy in the Balance: Do Scientific Advances Render Our
TraditionalNotions of Privacy Obsolete?, OR. ST. B. BuLL., May 2001, at 9, 13 ("1 made the
mistake of thinking that Justice Scalia might be a persuadable vote."). This interesting article
by Kyllo's attorney, written after oral arguments but before the Court announced its decision,
reveals his experiences before the Court and gives his impressions of the workings of the Court.
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This note discusses the need for the new rule advanced by Justice Scalia,
a rule that correctly finds a core of privacy protected by the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Part II of this note focuses on the
interpretive methods used by Justice Scalia when working with a
constitutional question, including his strong adherence to textualism, his
views on originalism, and his preference for clear, general principles that
foster predictability. Part III of this note briefly surveys the history of the
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, including the tension
between the "value-oriented" and "means" models. Part IV examines Kyllo
and explores how Justice Scalia's interpretive techniques and judicial
philosophy influenced the new rule. Part V analyzes Kyllo and addresses the
advantages and disadvantages of the rule announced by Justice Scalia, while
exploring some of the alternatives that were available - alternatives that
would have stopped short of creating a new rule.
This note argues that Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo stems from the
"new Fourth Amendment originalism" 9 movement led by Justice Scalia
within the Court. Originalism, plus Justice Scalia's preference for
establishing clear, general principles of decision and his belief in textualism,
help explain (1) Justice Scalia's presence in the majority and (2) the shift
toward a "value model"'" of the Fourth Amendment from the "means model"
that has gained increasing favor with the Court. Justice Scalia's textualism
led him to place particular significance on the fact that the police searched
Kyllo's home, one of the enumerated "protected objects of privacy" in the
Fourth Amendment. His version of originalism led him to "follow the
trajectory" of the Fourth Amendment when confronted with a new
technology, such as thermal imaging. In addition, Justice Scalia's
preference for clearly established rules led him to craft a rule that combined
several elements of other tests used by the Court to decide Fourth
Amendment cases, making the law clearer for the police, the people, and
courts.
1. Justice Scalia's InterpretativeMethods: Textualism, Originalism,
Clear General Principles,andPredictability
To fully comprehend Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo, it helps to
understand the methods he uses to interpret the law, whether statutes or
9. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.

REV. 1739, 1739 (2000).
10. See Melvin Gutternan, A Formulationof the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically EnhancedSurveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647,

680-87 (1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/7
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constitutional text. Justice Scalia adheres to three guiding principles:
textualism, originalism, and the desirability of clear rules in judicial
decisions."1
A. Textualism
In describing textualism, Justice Scalia quotes approvingly the words of
Justice Jackson: "'We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.""' Justice Scalia firmly believes that "'[j]udges
should be restricted to the text in front of them. . . .According to [his]
judicial philosophy, [he] feels bound not by what [he] think[s] ...but what
the text and tradition actually say.""' 3 He looks to the "objective indication
of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature" to find the law.' 4
Justice Scalia has asserted that at the core of his textualism is the belief that
the Constitution is "an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable
through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law."' 5
The difficulty of relying on textualism is determining what the words of
a given law actually mean. This problem only increases when a judge
applies textualism to constitutional analysis because the Constitution lays
out broad principles such as, "[tihe right of the people to be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 6 To discern meaning, Justice
Scalia uses an interpretive technique known as phiology, the formalistic
study of words.' 7 This emphasis leads Justice Scalia to place great
significance on the "ordinary social and dictionary meaning of individual
words" when analyzing a constitutional provision.'" "Justice Scalia
interprets text 'in as semantically precise [a] way as possible,' with close
attention to the formal rules of grammar."' 9 He uses, sometimes exclusively,
II. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ci. L. REv. 1175, 1178-85
(1989).
12. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23

(1997) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951)
(Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
13. Michael J.Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison ofJustices

Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25, 30 (1994) (quoting an interview with Justice Scalia in
Dan Izenberg, Clinging to the Constitution,JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 19, 1990).
14. SCALtA, supra note 12, at 29.
15. Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 854 (1989).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's
Fidelity to His ConstitutionalMethodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1389 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting George Kannar, Comment, The Constitutional
Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1308 (1990)).
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the dictionary meaning of words when interpreting statutes because of their
narrowly drawn words or phrases.2" Indeed, he evidences a bias toward
defining the words narrowly instead of giving statutes more expansive
readings. 2 '
When it comes to constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia takes a
different approach. He believes that "[i]n textual interpretation, context is
everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nitpicking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than
narrow interpretation - though not an interpretation that the language will
not bear." 22 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has used this broader interpretive
technique when addressing even specific constitutional clauses or phrases.23
One example of Justice Scalia's contextual approach in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment is his decision in Californiav. HodariD.,24 in which he
relied on an 1828 dictionary to define the word "seizure" to mean
"physically grasped" when a suspect refuses to submit.2 5 This decision
altered the existing precedent that a "seizure" generally occurs when a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave.26 Justice Scalia has used
textualism primarily as a means to restrict the expansion of constitutional
rights, such as substantive constitutional rights which he consistently
interprets narrowly. Justice Scalia, however, has had difficulty relying
solely on textualism to resolve constitutional problems.
B. Originalism
In addition to textualism, Justice Scalia employs originalism: the "theory
that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to the intent of

20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
21. Zlotnick, supra note 17, at 1390.
22. SCALIA, supra note 12, at 37.
23. See Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Rep., 525 U.S. 316, 346-47 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Dictionaries roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the
Constitution demonstrate that 'enumeration' requires an actual counting, and not just an
estimation of number."); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595 (1998)
(Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (using a 1796 dictionary to define
"abridging" to determine if statute violated freedom of speech guarantee in the First
Amendment); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (using Webster's An American
Dictionary of the English Language from 1828 to define "seizure" as "taking possession").
24. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
25. Id. at 624.
26. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990)
(Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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those who drafted and adopted it." 28 At first blush this might appear to
conflict with textualism and Justice Scalia's statement that he looks to
"objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature"
to find the law.29 Scalia, however, employs his own version of originalism.
His version, called "original meaning," is different from other forms of
originalism because instead of looking for the drafter's unexpressed
subjective intent, he looks for the original meaning of the text.30 As he
stated before the U.S. Senate, "[T]he text of the document and what it meant
to the society that adopted it ... [is] the starting point and beginning of
wisdom." 3
To determine the original meaning of constitutional provisions, Justice
Scalia often grounds his originalism in longstanding historical practices.32
In cases that he cannot resolve by using textual analysis, Justice Scalia
examines "whether the activity existed at common law and during the
drafting/ratification period."" Indeed, an essential element of the "new
Fourth Amendment originalism" is the belief that the Fourth Amendment
preserved the particular legal protections in place at the time of its framing,
putting "beyond time, place, and judicial predilection" certain "traditional
common-law guarantees. ' 34 Justice Scalia's version of originalism,
however, can also provide guidance when new situations arise that the
Framers could not have contemplated. He states:
There is plenty of room for disagreement as to what the original
meaning was, and even more as to how that original meaning
applies to the situation before the court. But the originalist at
least knows what he is looking for: the original meaning of the
text.... and sometimes there will be disagreement as to how that
original meaning applies to new and unforeseen phenomena.
How, for example, does the First Amendment guarantee of "the
freedom of speech" apply to new technologies that did not exist
when the guarantee was created - to sound trucks, or to
government-licensed over-the-air television? In such newfields
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th ed. 1999).

29. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
30. See SCALIA, supranote 12, at 38 ("What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what
I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen
intended.").
31. Hearingson the NominationofJudge Antonin Scalia Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 108 (1986).
32. Zlotnick, supra note 17, at 1393.
33. Id.
34. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Court must follow the trajectory of the FirstAmendment, so
to speak, to determine what it requires - and assuredly that
enterprise is not entirely cut-and-dried but requires the exercise
of judgment.3 5
C. Clear General Principlesof Decision
The final element in Justice Scalia's methodology is his desire to
establish clear, general principles of decision.36 Over the years, he has
rejected the view that courts should narrowly write the "holding" of a
decision narrowly to leave greater discretion to future courts."' He proposes
several reasons for this approach, some theoretical and some practical.3"
First, he argues that the creation of a holding involves many competing
values, of which creating the precise expression of the law is but a part.39
Another competing value is the appearance of equal treatment." He believes
that "the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law
making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well."'"
Therefore, he thinks that for the system of justice to command respect, two
cases decided differently must not only be different but must be seen to be
so.4 2 Indeed, Justice Scalia contends that it is better, "even at the expense
of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have
a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the
decision."43
Scalia finds a discretion-conferring approach particularly ill-suited to the
Supreme Court's holdings because that Court revisits cases so infrequently."
Accordingly, he believes that the "idyllic notion of 'the court' gradually
closing in on a fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete fact
situation after another until (by process of elimination, as it were) the truly
operative facts become apparent," to be particularly inappropriate. 5 In
35. SCALIA, supra note 12, at 45 (emphasis added).
36. Scalia, supra note 11, at 1179.
37. Id. at 1]78.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1178-79 ("The number of federal cases heard by [the Supreme Court] represented
about one-twentieth of one percent of all the cases decided by federal district courts, and less
than one-half of one percent of all cases decided by federal courts of appeals.").
45. Id. at 1178
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addition, he contends that such an approach would lead to a great deal of
nonuniformity because after the Court decides a case on the basis of the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, for instance, it is unlikely that it will
return to that issue in the foreseeable future. 6 The thirteen circuit courts
must then "close in on the law," which creates greater unpredictability.47
D. Predictability
Justice Scalia advances the desire for predictability as another reason to
create clear, general principles.4 He argues that people must be able to
ascertain what the law is and what it means. In addition, Justice Scalia finds
judicial restraint in announcing a general rule. By announcing a general
rule, the Court constrains not only lower courts but also the Supreme Court
by stare decisis because the Court will have committed itself to the
governing principle that is the basis of its decision.49 Under a totality-of-thecircumstances test, the Court, or even a lower court, could conclude that it
should decide a case differently "on balance."5 This approach would allow
a court to inject its own political or policy preferences and would not
provide the predictability the law requires.' Justice Scalia believes that
"[o]nly by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in."52
In addition to constraining courts, Justice Scalia believes that announcing
general rules empowers courts." Justice Scalia recognizes that society often
calls on judges to be courageous in making unpopular decisions. 4 He sees
the protection of the "individual criminal defendant against the occasional
excesses of [the] popular will" and the preservation of "the checks and
balances within our constitutional system that are precisely designed to
inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will"55 as two of
a judge's most significant roles. Justice Scalia believes that the ability to
stand behind a "solid shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier
cases" helpsjudges make unpopular decisions, for instance ones that result
in the release of convicted felons or in the exclusion of evidence.56 In

46. Id.at 1179.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
at 1179-80.
51. See id.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 1180.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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contrast, under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the popular will might
pressure judges to find otherwise.57
All three of Justice Scalia's interpretive tools work together in varying
degrees. Justice Scalia believes that the extent to which judges can extract
general rules from a statutory or constitutional command "depends
considerably upon how clear and categorical one understands the command
to be, which in turn depends considerably upon one's method of textual
exegesis."5 8 He claims that it is easier for him to develop general rules
because he is more "inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of a
text." 9 For Justice Scalia, originalism also plays a part in the judicial
crafting of general rules:
Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the formulation
of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to
a more or less originalist theory of construction. The raw
material for the general rule is readily apparent. If a barn was not
considered the curtilage of a house in 1791 or 1868 and the
Fourth Amendment did not cover it then, unlawful entry into a
barn today may be a trespass, but not an unconstitutional search
and seizure.6"
Appreciating which interpretive philosophy Justice Scalia brings to Kyllo
is just one part of understanding the decision. One must also understand the
history of the Fourth Amendment and the tug-of-war between the "value"
and "means" models of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
111. The Less-than-Smooth Course of the FourthAmendment
A. Tug-of-War: The Searchfor an Analytical Framework
Justice Frankfurter once complained, "The course of true law pertaining
to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not - to put it mildly run smoothly."'" Justice Frankfurter also noted that because searches and
seizures play such a frequent part in federal criminal trials, the law should
62
be "as clear and unconfusing as the nature of the subject-matter permits.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment have fluctuated over the years
depending on how the Court has interpreted "[t]he right of the people to be
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 1183-84.
Id. at 1184.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." '63
At present, the Court adheres to the test developed in Katz v. United
States64 to determine if there has been a "search" deserving of constitutional
protection. But it is also necessary to consider Boyd v. United States" and
Olmsteadv. UnitedStates"'to comprehend fully the tension that has plagued
the Fourth Amendment's history. These two cases represent opposite ends
of the tension between the "value-oriented model" and the "means model"
of Fourth Amendment analysis. Under a value-oriented model, there is a core
degree of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment - a core that the
amendment protects for its own sake and that has nothing to do with the
means employed by the government in a particular search.6 7 In contrast, the
means model concentrates on the methods used by the government as the
determining factor of whether the government has violated the Fourth
Amendment.
1. Boyd v. United States
In Boyd, Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, embraced the value-oriented
model68 by noting that it was not the manner by which the government
obtained the information that constituted the offense.69 Bradley declared that
the Fourth Amendment applied to
all invasions on the part of the government... of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.70
2. Olmstead v. UnitedStates
This value-oriented view of the Fourth Amendment would last just fortytwo years. In 1928, the Court in Olmsteadsubstantially reduced the scope of
its Fourth Amendment protections by finding that a government wiretap of a
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65. 116 U.S. 616(1886).
66. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
67. Gutterman, supra note 10, at 649.
68. Id. at 654 (stating that Justice Bradley "charted the course that placed the fourth
amendment upon 'a value-oriented model,").
69. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
70. Id.
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telephone conversation did not constitute a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it did not physically enter the
home or office. 7 Thus, the Olmstead Court judged the government conduct
by the means employed, not the value of the privacy interest to be protected.
Olmsteadwas a clear break from the Court's precedents and introduced the
principle that a physical trespass was a prerequisite to a finding of an
unreasonable search. 72 The Olmstead Court determined the extent of the
protection provided based on the trespass doctrine ofHester v. UnitedStates,73
a case that recognized certain constitutionally "protected areas." For instance,
the home, an area specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and the area
around the home known as the curtilage, were given constitutional
protection.74
B. Katz v. United State: The Return of the Value Model
Katz v. United States" signaled yet another change - the return to the
value model. The Katz Court believed that its predecessors were wrong in
maintaining that property concepts, such as trespass, had any place in defining
the limits of Fourth Amendment protections.76 Instead, the Court focused on
71. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66. Justice Brandeis dissented, stating:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which
the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home....
... The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 474, 478 (Brandeis, I., dissenting).
72. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as limited to the tangible fruits
of actual trespasses was a departure from the Court's previous decisions, notably Boyd, and a
misreading of the history and purpose of the Amendment.").
73. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
74. Id. at 59.

75. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
76. Id. at 353. Indeed, the Katz Court rejected he requirement of physical trespass for a
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the privacy right violated when government agents, acting without a search
warrant, attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public
telephone booth to overhear Katz's conversation.77 The Katz majority
recognized that although Katz had no property right in the public telephone
booth, he nevertheless had an expectation of privacy in his telephone
conversations.7 8
The Court presented the general rule: "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
' The Court
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."79
further stressed that the amendment protects people, not simply places.8 0
The test to determine if a search has occurred, known as the Katz test,
actually derives from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Justice Harlan
refined the majority's rule by devising the following two-part test:8" (1)the
person must have exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and
(2) that expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."8 2 The Katz Court clearly rejected the trespass requirement,8 3
implicitly rejected the constitutionally protected areas standard,84 and held that
Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy, even while talking on a public
telephone.8 5
C. Subsequent Limitation of Katz and the Return of the Means Model
The Katz Court intended to expand the protection of the Fourth Amendment
and to free it from the narrow confines of the trespass and constitutionallyprotected-area doctrines.8 6 In reaching the decision, the Court recognized the
privacy value that the Fourth Amendment protects. Unfortunately, while
attempting to explain that the Fourth Amendment protects people not places,

Fourth Amendment violation. See id.
77. Id.at 348.
78. Id.at 352.
79. Id.at 351-52 (citations omitted).
80. Id.at351.
81. Id.at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id.at 352.
84. See id.
at 351-53. Although the Katz Court noted that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people not places," Justice Harlan added, "The question, however, is what protection it affords
to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a 'place.'
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id at 352.
86. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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the opinion provided language that subsequent courts have used to limit the
promise of Katz.
By announcing that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection," 7 the Katz Court provided the tools to undercut the Court's
expanded reading of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Once again, the
focus shifted to examining the methods used by the police. Under this
approach, a showing that a person exposed information to others can often
defeat the person's claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy. Such exposure
could be minimal, as was the case in Californiav. Greenwood,88 in which the
"mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers [might] open and rummage
through the containers" was enough to defeat any claim of a legitimate
expectation of privacy in trash placed for collection on the curb.
IV Kyllo v. United States
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory of Kyllo
In Kyllo, Agent William Elliot of the United States Department of the
Interior suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home,
which was part of a triplex in Florence, Oregon. 9 Indoor marijuana
cultivation frequently requires high-intensity lamps that produce a significant
amount of heat.90 Agent Elliott, interested in determining whether Kyllo was
using these heat-producing lamps, used, without a warrant, an Agema
Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex.9 ' A thermal imager
detects infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit, but which is of a
wavelength not visible to the unaided eye.92 The thermal imager creates
images based on the relative warmth of objects and displays them on a video
screen.9 3 The imager displays areas that are relatively hot - compared to
other objects in view as white, and objects that are relatively cool as black.94
In just a few minutes, Agent Elliott and another agent scanned Kyllo's home
from two different angles - once from across the street in front of the house
and again from a street behind the house.95 The agents accomplished both
87. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.

88. 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
89. Kyilo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001).
90. id. at 29.
91. Id. at 30.

92. Id.
93. Id.at 29-30.
94. Id.
95. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/7

2003]

NOTES

scans from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle while located on a
public street.96 These scans showed that the garage roof and the side wall of
Kyl lo's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and to the
neighboring homes located in the triplex.97
From this information, Agent Elliott concluded that Kyllo was using halide
lamps to grow marijuana in his home.9" Using this evidence, tips from
informants, and utility records showing increased electrical use, Agent Elliott
obtained a warrant to search Kyllo's home.99 The search revealed that Kyllo
was indeed growing more than 100 marijuana plants in his residence, and he
was subsequently indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(l).'0 0 Kyllo entered a conditional guilty plea
after unsuccessfully moving to suppress the evidence seized from his home. 0 '
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the intrusiveness
of thermal imaging.0 2 On remand, the district court found that the Agema 210
(I) "is a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude
visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house"; (2) "did
not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure"; (3) "cannot
penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities"; and
(4) did not reveal "intimate details of the home."'0 3 Based on these findings,
the district court upheld the validity of the warrant and reaffirmed its denial
of the motion to suppress." 4 By a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit
initially reversed,0 5 but then affirmed the decision after a change in
composition of the panel, 0 6 with one judge dissenting.0 7 The Ninth Circuit,
relying on evidence that Kyllo purposefully vented the heat from his home,
held that under the Katz test, Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of
96. Id.at 30.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. United States v. Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, at *2(D. Or. Mar. 15, 1996).
104. Id.at *3.
105. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d
1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
106. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27(2001).
This change in composition of the panel resulted from one of the members of the majority
resigning because of health reasons and being replaced by a member who agreed with the former
dissent.
107. Id. at 1047-51 (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
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privacy because he had not attempted to conceal the heat escaping from his
home.'0 8 Even if Kyllo could have shown a subjective expectation, the court
found no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager
failed to "expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life."'" 9
B. The Kyllo Opinion
Kenneth Lerner, Kyllo's attorney, argued in his brief that the Katz test
should not apply to the search of a home." 0 He claimed that the Court should
only apply the test in cases dealing with "expectations of privacy in places
other than the home, where individual and societal expectations of privacy are
less clear."' " Lerner asked the Court to focus on the "core value" of personal
privacy that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect, noting that "'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home.. . has been embedded in our
Only after making this
traditions since the origins of the Republic.""'"
argument did he address the possibility that the Court would apply the Katz
test. If Katz were to apply, Lerner argued that Kyllo had a subjective and
reasonable expectation of privacy in the activities he conducted in his home.' 3
This argument was probably particularly appealing because Mr. Lerner's brief
appeared to be targeted at persuading Justice Scalia." 4
In Kyllo, Justice Scalia pointed out that the "Katz test - whether the
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable - has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective
and unpredictable.""' In addition to citing several notable authorities who
shared this criticism of Katz,"6 Justice Scalia cited his concurring opinion in
Minnesota v. Carter,"7 in which he described Katz as the "notoriously

108. Id. at 1046.
109. Id. at 1047.
110. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 12, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S..27 (2001) (No. 998508), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-court/briefs/99-8508/99-8508.
mer.aa.rtf (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
I1. Id.
112. Id. at 15-16 (alteration in original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601
(1980)).
113. Id. at27-32.
114. See supra note 8.
115. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at34.
116. Id.; see also I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d), at 393-94 (3d ed.
1996); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SUP. CT. REv. 173, 188.
117. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
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unhelpful test adopted in a 'benchmar[k]' decision that is 31 years old."' 8 He
attacked the test as subjective and "self-indulgent" and claimed that the past
three decades have established that, "unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective)
expectation[s] of privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable"' bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy
that this Court considers reasonable."" 9 Justice Scalia then explained that the
Fourth Amendment's text did not guarantee some generalized "right to
privacy" and then leave it to the Court to determine which particular
manifestations of the value of privacy "society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."' 2 Rather, the text "enumerated ('persons, houses, papers, and
effects') the objects of privacy protection to which the Constitution would
extend, leaving further expansion to the good judgment, not of th[e] Court but
of the people through their representatives in the legislature."'' With this in
mind, it is not difficult to see why Justice Scalia would find an argument
against the use of the Katz test appealing.
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court looks to the Katz test to answer
the threshold question of whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred,
i.e., whether the government violated a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.' Indeed, only when a search has occurred
is it constitutionally necessary that it be reasonable. Even while recognizing
that the Court adheres to the Katz test to determine when government action
amounts to a search, Justice Scalia related in a footnote the 1828 Webster's
Dictionarydefinition of "search," stating, "When the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, as now, to 'search' meant '[t]o look over or through for the purpose
of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to searchthe
house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.""2 " The inclusion of this
footnote drawn from the same dictionary Justice Scalia used in Californiav.
HodariD., in which he found the plain meaning of "seizure,"' 24 suggests that
he would like to bring a similar plain meaning - not the subjective Katz
test - definition of "search" to Fourth Amendment law.

118. Id.at 97 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The quotation marks around "benchmark" suggest
Scalia's cynicism toward the Katz opinion.
119. Id.(citation omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
120. Id.
121. Id.at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001).
123. Id. at 32 n.I (alteration in original) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989)).
124. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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In determining whether the government had conducted a "search" of
Kyl lo's home, Justice Scalia, in true originalist fashion, looked to the common
law traditions.'25 Justice Scalia acknowledged that it is often difficult to refine
Katz when the search is of "areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, or
even the curtilage['1 6] and uncovered portions of residences."' 27 A search of
the interior of a home, a place specifically addressed by the Fourth
Amendment, however, is "[t]he prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated area of protected privacy- there is a ready criterion, with roots deep
in common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
acknowledged to be reasonable."'28 In addition he wrote that "[t]o withdraw
protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology
to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."' 2 9
It is difficult to tell from the opinion the extent to which Justice Scalia
applied the Katz test. He never explicitly stated that Katz does not apply to
searches of homes, as Kyllo's attorney argued. 30 Justice Scalia appears to
have combined Mr. Lemer's arguments by using the traditional core value of
the Fourth Amendment - the protection of the sanctity of the home - to
satisfy the Katz test's second requirement - an expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable. The phrase "expectation of privacy that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable"'' in Scalia's description
of the common law view of the home suggests that he tailored his language to
fit the Katz test. At the same time, the fact that Justice Scalia used the 1828
dictionary definition of "search"' 32 and failed to address the first element of
the Katz test - the subjective expectation of privacy - creates doubts that
he applied Katz fully or at all.
The absence of any discussion of the subjective component of Katz is not
uncommon, as the Court, which relies on the objective component more
readily to dispose of search and seizure cases, often ignores or glosses over
this element.' 33 Indeed, defendants often easily meet the subjective element,
125. See supra notes 21, 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of the use of
common law traditions to help determine "original meaning").
126. Curtilage is defined as "[t]he land or yard adjoining a house, usually within an
enclosure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (7th ed. 1999).
127. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,39 (1988) ("It may well be that respondents
did not expect that the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or
other members of the public."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (subjective
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as illustrated by United States v. Ishmael.'34 In Ishmael, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a marijuana grower had a subjective expectation
in his waste heat but ultimately concluded that this expectation was not one
which society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.' 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the Ishmael court observed that the defendant in Katz had not
taken every precaution against electronic eavesdropping, but the court
nevertheless concluded that he exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy."' Similarly, in Californiav. Ciraolo,' a defendant was cultivating
marijuana in his backyard and had erected two high fences to prevent
observation from the ground. 3 Even though the defendant did not take
measures to prevent observation from the air, the Court concluded that the
defendant "[c]learly ...ha[d] met the test of manifesting his own subjective
intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural
pursuits."' a9
The fact that the subjective component did not receive any treatment in
Justice Scalia's opinion probably stems from reasons similar to those of the
Fifth Circuit, in addition to the fact that the Court chose to adopt Kyllo's view
of the interest invaded by the government. 4 The circuit courts that had
addressed similar searches had all framed the issue in terms of a subjective
expectation in the "waste heat" emitted from the house - trying to justify it
under the plain-view or public-exposure doctrines.' 4 ' The Court rejected this
mechanical interpretation and concluded that a thermal imager revealed the
relative heat of various rooms in the home. 42 Because Justice Scalia found
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home,1 43 and the defendant
expectation of privacy requirement satisfied by ten-foot fence, with respect to street traffic,
enough to satisfy requirement as to aerial observation); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
177 (1984) (not discussing the subjective prong, and simply stating that "[t] he Amendment does
not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
751 (1971) ("Very probably, individual defendants neither know nor suspect that their
colleagues have gone or will go to the police or are carrying recorders or transmitters.
Otherwise, conversation would cease . .
134. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
135. Id. at 855-56.
136. Id.at 854.
137. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
138. Id. at210.
139. Id. at 211.
140. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
141. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
142. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
143. Id.at34.
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concentrated his activities in the home, it is possible that Justice Scalia viewed
this first prong as obviously satisfied.
In addition to employing originalism in the Kyllo opinion, Justice Scalia
was concerned about line drawing and constructing clear, general rules. 44
The rule crafted in Kyllo is an attempt to provide a bright-line standard to
guide the actions of police and to provide security of privacy for the people. 45
'
In support of this proposed rule, Justice Scalia cited Carrollv. United States
for the proposition that "'[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens."" 46 Justice Scalia echoed this quote
when he stated that his new rule "assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."' 47 In his attempt to preserve the degree of privacy contemplated
when the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment, Kyllo presented Justice
Scalia with a technological advance never conceived of by those who adopted
the amendment. To deal with this problem, he "follow[ed] the trajectory" of
the Fourth Amendment to determine what its provisions require. 4 8
The creation of the Kyllo rule 9 serves many of Justice Scalia's aims of
establishing clear, general rules. It creates predictability, just as Katz did for
electronic eavesdropping cases, by declaring presumptively unreasonable the
warrantless use of devices that provide details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion. 5 It avoids the
uncertainty of the standard suggested by the dissent, which would allow such
surveillance as long as it revealed no intimate details.' 5 It also avoids the
unenviable task of constructing a jurisprudence specifying which home
52
activities are "intimate" enough to warrant Fourth Amendment protection.
In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out that even if the Court could develop
such jurisprudence, an individual police officer would have no idea what

144. See supra Part I.C.
145. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39.
146. Id. at 40 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
147. Id. at 34.
148. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
149. "Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
150. Id.
151. Id. at38.
152. Id. at 38-39.
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activities he would detect before a scan, whether intimate or not, so that he
could never really know whether his "search" would be constitutional.'
C. The Dissent's Criticism ofJustice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, dissented in Kyllo. 54 They contended that the proper way to
classify the interest invaded by the government's use of the imager was as
"waste heat" escaping from Kyllo's home in which he did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.155 The dissent asserted that the voluntary
exposure of the heat to the rest of the world through Kyllo's venting brought
the case within the plain-view exception because "' [w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."" 56 As noted above, it was the proper classification of this interest - either as "waste heat" akin to the trash in California
v. Greenwood, or as the heat-generating activities within the home - which
had divided circuit courts.'
Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia's new rule because its protection
appears to dissipate as soon as the relevant technology is in "general public
use."'5 8 He suggested that the thermal-imagining device used in the case met
this requirement but also pointed out that the Court did not provide any
criteria for judging when a specific technology is in "general public use."' 59
In support of his assertion that the thermal imager was in general public use,
Justice Stevens noted that upwards of 12,000 thermal imagers were in use in
the United States. 160 Whatever Justice Scalia meant by "general public use,"
this number apparently did not satisfy the criteria.
Justice Stevens' dissent also attacked Justice Scalia's "newly minted rule"
as being both too broad and too narrow. 16' He argued that it is too broad
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id.at 41 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986)).
157. After circuit courts made this classification, the application of the Katz test created
predictable results. If the focus was on the heat-generating activities within the home, the lower
courts found a "search"; where the focus was on "waste heat," they found no "search." See
United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995) (no subjective expectation of
privacy); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
158. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id.at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id.at 48 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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because it would encompass things such as mechanical substitutes for dogs
trained to react when they sniff narcotics. 62 He noted that the Court had ruled
in United States v. Place163 that a canine sniff was not a "search" because it
only "discloses the presence or absence of narcotics," and he argued that it
must follow that sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal
activity is not a search either.' This argument, however, does not necessarily
follow.
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the canine sniff analogy in State
v. Young,'6 5 by relying on another case, UnitedStates v. Thomas, 166 a Second
Circuit opinion that held that canine sniffs of private residences constitute a
Fourth Amendment search. 67 The Thomas court noted that
[w]ith a trained dog police may obtain information about what is
inside a dwelling that they could not derivefrom the use of their
senses. Consequently, the officers' use of a dog is not a mere
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses
improve vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by
a different, and far superior, sensory instrument.'6"
Justice Stevens also argued that the rule is too narrow in that it only applies
to information regarding the "interior" of the home.169 He argued that Justice
Scalia should not limit to the home a rule designed to protect individuals from
162. Id.
163. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Place was an unnecessary decision, mere dictum in a case
decided on other grounds, but dictum that the Court has shown no willingness to readdress and
which it has reaffirmed implicitly in recent cases such as City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32 (2000).
In Place, Justice Blackmun argued:
The Court's resolution of the status of dog sniffs under the Fourth Amendment is
troubling for a different reason.... The issue also was not presented to or decided
by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, contrary to the Court's apparent intimation,
an answer to the question is not necessary to the decision. For the purpose of this
case, the precise nature of the legitimate investigative activity is irrelevant.
Regardless of the validity of a dog sniff under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure
was too intrusive. The Court has no need to decide the issue here.
.. Neither party has had opportunity to brief the issue, and the Court grasps
for the appropriate analysis of the problem ....
The Court is certainly in no
position to consider all the ramifications of this important issue.
Place, 462 U.S. at 723-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
164. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
166. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
167. Id. at 1367.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment by the government, citing
Katz's proposition that "'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. ""' In response to this criticism, a continuation of the quote from Katz
is helpful. It continues, "The question, however, is what protection it affords
to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires
reference to a 'place."""' For Justice Scalia, as noted, the home is the
"prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy"
and thus deserves significant constitutional protections.' 72
V Analysis of Kyllo
The Kyllo opinion is perhaps as significant as Katz, and it will serve as the
guidepost for future decisions involving the home and inevitable advances in
technology. It is also an opinion that the Court did not necessarily have to
reach. The majority could have decided the case by merely applying the Katz
test to the facts.' 73 As noted, when the Katz test is applied with the focus on
the heat-generating activities in the home instead of on so-called "waste heat,"
lower courts and state supreme courts had found a violation of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 74 The Kyllo majority could have easily adopted this
already developed body of law to resolve this case.
By adopting a traditional Katz analysis, Fourth Amendment law would have
remained uniform instead of splintered into a series of different rules for
courts to apply to different fact patterns. As it stands, the Katz test applies in
all situations in which government activity might have invaded a
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy, except when this activity
involves the use of an electronic device and the expectation of privacy centers
on a home. The Kyllo opinion thus adds another bump in the course of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which has not "run smoothly."' 7
The dissent accurately identified one of the disadvantages of adopting
Justice Scalia's new rule, one that the recent terrorist attacks of September
11th make even more compelling:

170. Id. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
171. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
172. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also supra notes 121, 128 and accompanying text.
173. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1227 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996).
174. See supranote 157 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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[Plublic officials should not have to avert their senses or their
equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain such as
excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases,
airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could
identify hazards to the community. In my judgment, monitoring
such emissions with "sense-enhancing technology," and drawing
useful conclusions from such monitoring, is an entirely reasonable
public service.
On the other hand, the countervailing privacy interest is at best
trivial.76
The advantages of the new rule, however, outweigh any disadvantages. As
noted, Justice Scalia's methodology and philosophy greatly influenced the
creation of the rule, both of which hold many advantages. 17 His textualist and
originalist views led him to adopt a rule that "assures preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted."' 8 His new rule - "[w]here... the Government
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant"' 79 - is a significant improvement over Katz. It combines the best
elements of the never explicitly abandoned constitutionally-protected-area
doctrine and the Katz test. It looks to the text of the Fourth Amendment, with
its specifically enumerated protection of the home, to find a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home. It does away with the subjective
component of the Katz test and raises a presumption that any search using
such a device is unreasonable. Abandoning the subjective component and the
finding that it is reasonable to expect privacy in one's home are excellent
improvements on Katz. Now, instead of a criminal defendant having to show
that he had both a subjective and legitimate expectation of privacy in the
illegal activities conducted in the home, the burden shifts to the state tojustify
its search. The state can justify searches by showing an exception to the
warrant requirement, by showing that the device is in "general public use," or
by obtaining a warrant.
The requirement that the device not be in "general public use" incorporates
elements of the Katz test. The presumption that a search of a home is
unreasonable dissipates if the device used to search is widely used by the
176.
177.
178.
179.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See supra notes 125-53 and accompanying text.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 40.
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public. In Katz terms, a person cannot claim a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such a situation because he would know that his activities were
open to public view. This allows the test to remain viable and responsive to
the needs of law enforcement while providing a greater degree of protection
than the Katz test might provide for the core privacy value protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
Kyllo illustrates how Justice Scalia's belief in textualism, his adherence to
originalism, and his desire for clear principles of decision helped craft a
bright-line rule addressing the advances of technology. By taking the long
view of the threat of technology to the privacy of the home, Justice Scalia
constructed a rule that avoids what Mr. Lerner, Kyllo's attorney, predicted
would happen during oral arguments:
I think that you will probably have then a series of cases every time
a thermal imager is used on a different wall or on a window or the
newest version of the technology comes up, and I think it really
makes sense, unless the Court wants to revisit this every few years,
to look at what the capability of the science is. 0
Kyllo prevents this situation and moves the Court closer to realizing Justice
Scalia's goal:
It is my inclination - once we have taken the law as far as it can
go, once there is no general principle that will make this particular
search valid or invalid, once there is nothing left to be done but
determine from the totality of the circumstances whether this
[particular] search and seizure was "reasonable" - to leave that
essentially factual determination to the lower courts. We should
take one case now and then, perhaps, just to establish the margins
of tolerable diversity.181
The future consequences of Justice Scalia's originalism on Fourth
Amendment law are difficult to estimate, but in the case of Kyllo, they have
helped slow the erosion of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Scott Byrd

180. Oral Argument of Kenneth Lerner on Behalf of the Petitioner, Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), available at 2001 WL 168056, at *10.
181. Scalia, supra note 11, at 1186.
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